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Executive Summary 
 
Many people in the world lead intolerably insecure lives. In many cases, insecurity is the 
consequence of conflicts in which civilians are deliberately targeted with impunity. In an 
era of global interdependence, Europeans can no longer feel secure when large parts of 
the world are insecure.  
 
Over the last few years, the European Union has been developing a common security 
policy. In December 2003, the European Council agreed a European Security Strategy 
(ESS), which advocates preventive engagement and effective multilateralism. This report 
is about implementation of the ESS. It argues that Europe needs the capability to make a 
more active contribution to global security. It needs military forces but military forces 
need to be configured and used in new ways. The report focuses on regional conflicts 
and failed states, which are the source of new global threats including terrorism, weapons 
of mass destruction and organised crime. 
 
The report proposes a ‘Human Security Doctrine’ for Europe. Human security refers to   
freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations. 
The doctrine comprises three elements: 
 
• A set of seven principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity that 
apply to both ends and means. These principles are: the primacy of human rights, 
clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, 
the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force. The report puts 
particular emphasis on the bottom-up approach: on communication, 
consultation, dialogue and partnership with the local population in order to 
improve early warning, intelligence gathering, mobilisation of local support, 
implementation and sustainability. 
 
•  A ‘Human Security Response Force’, composed of 15,000 men and women, of 
whom at least one third would be civilian (police, human rights monitors, 
development and humanitarian specialists, administrators, etc.). The Force would 
be drawn from dedicated troops and civilian capabilities already made available 
by member states as well as a proposed ‘Human Security Volunteer Service’.  
 
• A new legal framework to govern both the decision to intervene and operations 
on the ground. This would build on the domestic law of host states, the domestic 
law of sending states, international criminal law, international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law. 
 
The report proposes that the Human Security Response Force would be under the 
direction of the new Foreign Minister of Europe, appointed under the Constitution 
agreed in Dublin in June 2004. The report proposes measures to increase democratic 
control of security policy and to improve accountability to the local population as well as 
methods of financing.  
 
This is a critical moment for the European Union. The Union has expanded to include 
ten new members and has approved a new Constitution. In the aftermath of September 
11 and the war in Iraq, Europe has a historic responsibility to contribute to a safer and 
more just world. 

A Human Security Doctrine for Europe 
1 Introduction 
 
Many people in the world lead intolerably insecure lives. Sometimes, their insecurity has 
natural causes, like earthquakes or disease. In many cases, however, insecurity is the 
consequence of conflicts in which civilians are deliberately targeted with impunity. In 
Western Sudan, hundreds of thousands of people have been forcibly displaced from their 
homes as a result of killings, rape, abductions and looting by government-sponsored 
militias. In Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, hundreds of thousands of refugees and 
displaced people are unable to return to their homes or settle, as their lasting insecurity 
has become a political tool manipulated by politicians in support of their positions in the 
conflicts. In Palestine, people live in daily fear of land seizures, demolition of houses and 
assassination; the inability to protect one's self, family and property produces an 
overwhelming sense of humiliation and insecurity among Palestinians. In turn, daily 
activities like going to the market or to a café have become perilous undertakings for 
ordinary Israelis because of suicide bombings. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
more than three million people have been killed over the last decade, and millions more 
have been forced to flee their homes. And as has happened in many other places, tens of 
thousands of women have been raped; gang rapes, rapes of children as young as four and 
women as old as 80 have been reported, contributing to the HIV/Aids epidemic in the 
region. Perpetrators go unpunished. 
It is these conflicts that become the ‘black holes’ generating many of the new 
sources of insecurity that impact directly on the security of the citizens of the European 
Union. The South Caucasus and the Balkans export or transport hard drugs and guns to 
the European Union, as well as trafficking or smuggling people who are often sexually 
exploited or forced to work in the illegal economy. The worsening situation in Palestine 
and Iraq is used by Islamic militants as evidence of a Judaeo-Christian conspiracy against 
Islam, to recruit terrorists. Wars in Africa defeat Europe’s efforts to fight poverty and 
disease with development initiatives.  
Generally, contemporary conflicts are characterised by circumstances of 
lawlessness, impoverishment, exclusivist ideologies and the daily use of violence. This 
makes them fertile ground for a combination of human rights violations, criminal 
networks and terrorism, which spill over and cause insecurity beyond the area itself. 
While these developments may initially have appeared to apply primarily to developing 
and conflict states, the 11 September and 11 March attacks have made it clear once and 
for all that no citizens of the world are any longer safely ensconced behind their national 
borders, and that sources of insecurity are no longer most likely to come in the form of 
border incursions by foreign armies. 
To be secure, in today’s world, Europeans need to make a contribution to global 
security. Europe needs military forces but they need to be configured and used in quite 
new ways. They need to be able to prevent and contain violence in different parts of the 
world in ways that are quite different from classic defence and war-fighting.  They need 
to be able to address the real security needs of people in situations of severe insecurity in 
order to make the world safer for Europeans. At present Europe lacks such capabilities. 
Europe has 1.8 million people under arms but only a fraction can be deployed in crisis 
zones. Europe also needs to be able to deploy more police, human rights monitors, aid 
specialists, and many other kinds of civilian expertise.  
The starting point for this report is the European Security Strategy (ESS) agreed 
by the European Council in December 2003. The ESS makes Europe’s responsibility for 
global security the centrepiece of a European security strategy. It points out that ‘the post 
Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and 
external aspects of security are indissolubly linked’. The ESS makes the case for 
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preventive engagement, for a strategy of effective multilateralism and for the extension of 
the international rule of law. It argues that the European Union needs to be ‘more active’ 
and ‘more capable’. 
This report is about how to make the European Union more capable. The 
approach is ‘bottom-up’, that is to say, it is concerned with how to increase the security 
of individual human beings in different parts of the world. The report elaborates both a 
set of principles on which Europe’s security policy should be built, and the capabilities it 
will need to make a credible contribution to global security, on which depends the 
security of Europe itself. In effect, it proposes a new doctrine for implementing the 
European Security Strategy.  
The report focuses on the capabilities needed for dealing with situations of severe 
physical insecurity, ‘freedom from fear’, rather than the whole range of possibilities and 
instruments of European foreign and security policy.  
 
2 Human security and the European Union 
 
2.1 The changed global context 
In today’s world, there is a gap between current security capabilities, consisting largely of 
military forces, and real security needs. The ESS lists five key threats to Europe: 
terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing 
states, and organised crime. All of these threats are interlinked and they can be found in 
different combinations in situations of severe insecurity. As the ESS points out, ‘none of 
the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means’. 
These five key threats are not just threats to Europe; they are global threats. They 
are even more threatening to the people living in situations of severe insecurity. The 
main sources of political insecurity are either authoritarian states that repress their own 
citizens or a combination of state and non-state armed groups in conditions of state 
failure. Traditional security policy was based on defence of borders and the ‘containment’ 
of threats. This often meant support for authoritarian regimes, including military 
intervention or the maintenance of bases, regardless of the consequences for people 
living in the countries in question. This approach, based on a narrow definition of 
national interest, is no longer realistic in a world characterised by global 
interconnectedness. Insecurity experienced by people living in places like the Middle East 
has a tendency to spread, as September 11 dramatically illustrated.  Moreover, it is very 
difficult to sustain closed societies in a global era – opening up to trade, travel and, above 
all, communication undermines the stability of authoritarian regimes. Although bastions 
of authoritarianism still persist in the Middle East and large parts of Asia, civil unrest and 
various degrees of state failure are more common facts of life in many regions. Saudi 
Arabia, for example, used to be considered the paragon of authoritarian stability; now the 
volatile combination of a frustrated young population and al-Qaeda ideology is turning 
Saudi Arabia into a powder keg.  State collapse is becoming the most likely alternative to 
democratic transition. This is why preventive engagement to facilitate democratic 
transition is a better approach than containment. 
State collapse has resulted in ‘new wars’ in Africa, the Balkans, Central Asia and 
the Caucasus. These wars are unlike either the international or civil wars of the past. They 
call into question the distinctions between ‘human rights violations’ by states, ‘abuses’ by 
non-state actors, and ‘conflict’ between armed combatants: battles are rare and most 
violence is inflicted on civilians. In particular, population displacement is a typical feature 
of such wars, both as a result of deliberate ethnic cleansing and because of the difficulty 
of distinguishing between civilians and combatants. Such wars blur the distinction 
between internal and external because they spill over borders and involve both local and 
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global actors. They also blur the distinction between public and private, since they 
involve regular forces as well as paramilitary groups, warlords, mercenaries, and 
organized crime groups.  ‘New wars’ spawn an abnormal political economy, in which 
most income-generating activity, ranging from Diaspora support to trafficking of various 
kinds to loot and pillage, depends on violence and coercion. 
In these types of situations, the use of traditional forms of military power can 
often be counter-productive. One reason is the changing nature of military power. Small 
arms, grenades, and other weapons have become cheaper and easier to acquire, so the 
difference between those who possess advanced military technology and those who do 
not has been reduced.  The advantage Western states have in such situations in terms of 
military technology is much less than the difference in expenditure. They have an 
advantage in the air and in information technology. Air power can be very destructive 
and the use of advanced military technology can be effective against governments, as was 
shown in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the technology does not help troops with imposing 
and maintaining order or protecting civilians – with coping, for instance, with suicide 
bombers who have relatively unsophisticated technology, or preventing ethnic cleansing 
as in Kosovo after the war against Yugoslavia.   
The consequence of the large-scale, intrusive wars of the last two centuries was 
not only the introduction of legal constraints on war but also growing public pressures 
against war. Human rights norms have become much more prominent, and an 
intervention that uses traditional war-fighting means, such as bombardment from the air, 
may be unacceptable when viewed through the lens of human rights. While 
contemporary Western governments do try to minimize civilian casualties, they cannot 
avoid such casualties altogether: so-called precision bombs do kill civilians and cause 
material destruction because of either technical or intelligence failures. Civilian casualties 
may contribute to polarised perceptions that accentuate the conflict, while the 
destruction of infrastructure and regular sources of income feeds the criminal economy 
that is a source of finance for warring groups. The ongoing conflict in Iraq dramatically 
illustrates the gap between conventional military forces and the achievement of security. 
  
2.2 Why is human security of concern to the European Union 
In the new global context, the European Union’s security policy should be built on 
human security and not only on state security. Human security means individual freedom 
from basic insecurities. Genocide, wide-spread or systematic torture, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, disappearances, slavery, and crimes against humanity and grave 
violations of the laws of war as defined in the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) are forms of intolerable insecurity that breach human security. Massive violations 
of the right to food, health and housing may also be considered in this category, although 
their legal status is less elevated. A human security approach for the European Union 
means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and 
not focus only on the defence of the Union’s borders, as was the security approach of 
nation-states. 
There are three reasons why the European Union should adopt a human security 
concept. The first reason is based on morality. It has to do with our common humanity. 
Human beings have a right to live with dignity and security, and a concomitant obligation 
to help each other when that security is threatened. All human life is of equal worth, and 
it is not acceptable that human lives become cheap in desperate situations. There is 
nothing distinctively European about such moral norms. On the contrary, they are by 
their nature universal. Whenever European states have intervened abroad for 
humanitarian reasons, whether in Kosovo, East Timor or Sierra Leone, this has been 
based on strong public support, even public pressure, from European citizens. Moreover, 
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beyond state action, large numbers of Europeans have voluntarily gone to Yugoslavia to 
deliver humanitarian assistance or to help with post-conflict reconstruction, to 
Guatemala to accompany returning refugees, or to Palestine as civilian monitors. 
A second reason is legal. If human security is considered as a narrower category 
of protection of human rights, as proposed above, then it is now generally accepted that 
other states, and international institutions such as the EU, have not only a right, but also 
a legal obligation to concern themselves with human security worldwide. Articles 55 and 
56 of the United Nations Charter enjoin states to promote universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights. This obligation is restated in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and a range of human rights treaties all member states of the European 
Union have ratified. 
 In its new Constitution, the European Union explicitly recognises the same 
obligation. Article 4 states: ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold 
and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable 
development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair 
trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights and in particular children's 
rights, as well as to strict observance and development of international law, including 
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’ The European Union does, 
therefore, recognise that it has obligations concerning the human security of people 
outside its borders. However, the nature and extent of these obligations are subject to 
different interpretations, and they form an area of controversy and disagreement among 
legal scholars. 
 The third reason for adopting a human security approach is ‘enlightened self-
interest’. The whole point of a human security approach is that Europeans cannot be 
secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity. In failing states and conflict 
areas, the criminal economy expands and gets exported: the drug trade, human trafficking 
and the easy availability of small arms, and even the brutalisation of society are not 
contained within the conflict zone but felt beyond it, including in Europe. When the state 
breaks down, communalist ideologies are mobilised, generally rooted in religion or 
ethnicity; and while this leads first and foremost to a spiral of violence within the conflict 
zones, terrorist networks also thrive upon and recruit from such situations, with the 
effects again felt in Europe.  
In practice, the enlightened self-interest case for adopting a human security 
approach comes very close to the moral and legal cases, which is why this approach 
should now be considered as a form of realism, not just idealism. Dealing with terrorism 
and organized crime only by devising more robust punitive and intelligence measures 
within our borders, which may in fact endanger the democratic values and institutions of 
Europe, can never be more than fire-fighting. The only real response to such threats is to 
address the security needs of people in situations of severe insecurity. This will not 
deliver perfect security to Europeans, but it is the most credible way to address the 
causes of insecurity at source.  
 
2.3 Human security enforcement 
This report focuses on situations of severe insecurity, where European forces might be 
deployed. These situations fall under the rubric of the ‘Petersberg’ tasks, agreed by the 
Western European Union in Bonn in 1992, included in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 
and expanded in the new Constitution. These tasks ‘include joint disarmament 
operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict 
prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation’. The overall aim of operations in 
these situations is to uphold human rights and to act in support of law and order. Up to 
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now, there has not been a comprehensive doctrine for implementation of these 
operations. 
 Such operations are somewhere between classic peacekeeping and classic military 
intervention but different from both. Classic peacekeeping operations were based on the 
notion of keeping the peace between armed combatants. Generally, the job of 
peacekeepers was to monitor cease-fires and separate warring parties. Even more recent 
peace support operations with seemingly more robust mandates have not always 
protected civilians against human rights violations. Classic military interventions, on the 
other hand, have been aimed at defeating an enemy, whether the enemy is defined as 
insurgents (communists or mujahideen during the Cold War, separatists or islamist 
militants today) or repressive dictators (the Taliban or Saddam Hussein). Even though 
such interventions sometimes emphasise the protection of civilians or the need to find a 
political settlement, the priority placed on defeating insurgents can lead to the 
inappropriate use of force and increased political polarisation. In other words, peace 
comes before human rights in classic peace-keeping and victory comes before human 
rights in classic military interventions. 
 The lessons of international interventions in places like the Balkans, Afghanistan 
or Iraq, are that international forces have been ill-equipped for the kinds of tasks 
required to restore public security. In these regions, international forces have been unable 
to prevent continued human rights violations and the spread of organised crime and this 
has caused considerable soul-searching about the kind of capabilities required.   
Some would describe the kind of operation that supports human security as 
humanitarian intervention. However, the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ implies a 
purely military approach. The ESS emphasises that ‘military instruments may be needed 
to restore order’ in failed states and in regional conflicts, but alongside humanitarian 
assistance, effective policing, civilian crisis managements as well as broader political and 
economic instruments. It makes the point that the European Union is ‘particularly well-
equipped for these multi-faceted situations.’ These kinds of tasks are sometimes 
described as ‘state-building’, ‘nation-building’ or ‘post-conflict reconstruction’. But they 
do not apply only to post-conflict situations. A more holistic approach is needed that 
covers different types of political institutions and different phases of conflict or state 
failure. 
  Of course, European security policy should be grounded in pragmatism. The 
European Union’s capacity for operational missions is limited, as is the political will to 
carry them out. Chances of success, degrees of risk, and levels of commitment vary. The 
following factors should be taken into account in order to prioritise certain situations 
over others: 
 
• Gravity and urgency of the situation. A looming genocide would nearly 
always deserve priority over a chronic situation of widespread, even severe, 
insecurity. 
 
• Practicality of the mission, risks, chances of success and availability 
of other actors. On this basis, a mission to Macedonia would be likely to 
deserve priority over a mission to Burma, Tibet or Chechnya, even if the 
security situation in the latter places is much worse, and no other actors are 
available. In Southeast Asia, Australia may be willing to shoulder more of the 
burden, as it did in the mission to East Timor. In Africa, more responsibility 
should be taken by the African Union. In both cases, Europe may still be called 
upon within a multilateral framework. 
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• Special responsibility for neighbouring countries. There is a clear self-
interest argument here: the effects of insecurity and disorder in the Balkans for 
instance, are more strongly felt in Europe in terms of crime, refugee flows and 
human trafficking than the effects of conflicts further away. Beyond the self-
interest argument however, European citizens simply feel a stronger moral 
responsibility towards helping those in Europe’s neighbourhood, as has been 
very clear in the wars in Yugoslavia.  
 
• Historic ties and historic responsibilities. These typically continue to run 
along colonial lines: the Dutch, for example, feel a special commitment to 
Indonesia, the French to Cote d’Ivoire, the British to Zimbabwe and the 
Portuguese to East Timor. This is not just because of a sense of responsibility; 
it is also because there are many human ties at the level of civil society. 
Nevertheless, precisely because of the colonial history, the state in question, 
while feeling the most committed, may not always be the most appropriate 
actor to intervene. Concerted action by the European Union can to some 
extent alleviate this thorny problem, by mediating the involvement of the 
former colonial power. 
 
• Public concern and public pressure. Public support is necessary to 
legitimate and sustain the risk and expenditure of operations. It can also shape 
the nature of the action: public pressure is more likely to be based on solidarity 
rather than on geopolitical considerations. Public pressure is, of course, uneven, 
and not necessarily related to the scale of an impending or unfolding tragedy or 
to proximity or colonial ties. Europeans have greater concern for Israel and 
Palestine than for the South Caucasus conflicts, which are no further away 
from Europe. The Live Aid concert organized by Bob Geldof, one of the 
earliest and biggest civil society actions related to human security outside the 
region, concerned Ethiopia, a country with no geographic proximity to Europe. 
 
2.4 An opportunity for Europe 
There has always been a strand of European thinking that considers Europe as a ‘peace 
project’. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the founders of what was 
to become the European Union wanted, above all, to prevent another war on European 
territory. And after the Cold War, the European Union was considered an important 
instrument in overcoming the East-West division of Europe. Preventing war continues 
to be a strong motive in the minds of European citizens: when asked what the European 
Union means to them personally, the third answer that comes up in the Eurobarometer 
survey, right after the euro and freedom of movement, is ‘peace’. Indeed, 89 per cent of 
respondents consider ‘maintaining peace and security in Europe’ to be a priority of the 
EU. It is also considered to be the most effective of EU policies. People living in the new 
Eastern member states of the European Union are especially concerned about security 
because of their particular histories, even though they sometimes have different 
perceptions about how this can be achieved. 
The European Union pioneered the technique of integration at the level of 
society, based on interdependence and adherence to common standards, as a way of 
promoting peace. The same approach should be adopted in external relations. Elements 
of this approach are contained in association agreements, trade and other forms of co-
operation. It should be extended to the rule of law and public security. And if necessary, 
it must be guaranteed by the use of military capabilities. 
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The experience of the Kosovo war indicated the need for European security 
forces to be able to act autonomously. Since then, progress towards a European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP) has accelerated. Member states have made available up to 
60,000 troops under the Headline Goals, agreed in Helsinki in December 2001, and they 
have made even more rapid progress in making available civilian capabilities, including 
police, rule of law experts, and specialists in civil administration and civil protection. 
Agreements have been reached on the relationship of EU forces to NATO and on 
structured co-operation among member states. Various institutions have been established 
for conflict prevention, training, and crisis management. As well as the ESS approved in 
December 2003, the European Council has approved the establishment of an 
autonomous Defence Agency and a military-civil planning cell. The EU is now 
developing ‘battle groups’ for rapid deployment. A number of proposals have been put 
forward for a European gendarmerie and for a civilian peace corps. The coordination of 
these initiatives and the appointment of a new European Foreign Minister offer real 
potential for further development. 
Perhaps more significantly, the EU has now undertaken several autonomous 
missions in the Balkans and Africa, involving military, police and civilian personnel. 
Three of the missions (the EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Operation 
Proxima in Macedonia, and Operation EUJUST- Themis, the rule of law mission in 
Georgia) have been civilian. Two (Concordia in Macedonia and Artemis in DRC) have 
been military and much shorter than the civilian missions. The EU mission which will 
take over the NATO-led SFOR forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of 2004, 
will involve both military and civilian capabilities side by side. Non-member states have 
as a matter of course been invited to take part in these missions. 
Operation Artemis in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo represents a 
possible template for future multi-national interventions. It was quite different from 
classic military interventions in Africa whether by the United Nations (peacekeeping) or 
post-colonial powers, which were generally aimed at shoring up shaky authoritarian 
regimes. It was a response to the emergency situation in Ituri, where various militias 
including thousands of young children, were laying waste to towns, looting, raping, 
carrying out massacres and causing tens of thousands of people to flee their homes.  UN 
forces on the ground were unable to deal with the situation. For the first time, in its 
resolution of 31 May 2003, the UN Security Council approved an EU mission. 
The mission of over 2000 troops was deployed rapidly and the bulk were in place 
by 1 July. The mission was aimed at security on the ground and the immediate impact 
was considerable. However the mission was short and massacres started again in later 
months. although on a smaller scale. Many problems, such as the disarmament of militia 
or the establishment of effective police forces, remain to be solved and the EU has been 
slow to deploy civilian follow-up. 
Optimism about the emerging consensus on Europe’s external role should, of 
course, be tempered by the events of the past decade. Repeated missed opportunities, 
like the inability to offer a coherent policy towards the former Yugoslavia in the early 
1990s, the vacillation over the Middle East, the failure to intervene to prevent the 
genocide in Rwanda, or the divisions over Iraq, not to mention continued tensions in the 
Balkans, call into question the ability of the European Union ever to act coherently and 
effectively. The rise of nationalist feelings as expressed in the electoral success of anti-
immigration and anti-EU parties weaken further the ability of European political elites to 
act at a European level.  
Yet an imaginative, forward-looking contribution to global security could turn 
out to be the most effective way to mobilise political support for the European project at 
this point. The approval of a new Constitution and the enlargement of the Union mark a 
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critical juncture in the history of the EU. If they are to continue to support the process 
of European institution-building, Europeans need to feel that the Union contributes to 
their security. In an interdependent world, this can only be achieved through a European 
contribution to the security of human beings in general. 
 
3 Principles for a new European security doctrine 
 
The word ‘doctrine’ tends to mean a body of knowledge that is taught or used for 
instruction. In the military field, it refers to the know-how of fighting; it is about the 
implementation of strategy and its link with tactics. The Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) is often described as a new doctrine. It is about the way in which information 
technology has changed military tactics – the shift from ‘platform-centric’ to ‘network-
centric’ warfare. Although technology is undoubtedly an important factor in the changed 
global context, this report focuses on human capabilities. It spells out seven principles 
that encompass both goals and implementation of European security policy and draws 
up the capabilities (human, cultural, technological, legal, and organisational) required to 
follow those principles. The principles for a European security doctrine are drawn from 
the actual experience of insecurity in different parts of the world – Central and West 
Africa, South East Europe, the South Caucasus and the Middle East.  
The ESS rightly places much emphasis on the ‘prevention’ of crises as opposed 
to the doctrine of ‘pre-emption’. But it is often difficult to distinguish between different 
phases of conflict. The conditions that cause conflict – fear and hatred, a criminalised 
economy that profits from violent methods of controlling assets, weak illegitimate states, 
the existence of warlords and paramilitary groups, for example – are often exacerbated 
during and after periods of violence and there are no clear beginnings or endings. The 
situation in Palestine, for instance, was supposed to be ‘post-conflict’ after the Oslo 
accords, but has clearly reverted to being in the midst of conflict. The conflicts of the 
South Caucasus used to be called ‘frozen’, but ‘festering’ might have been a better 
characterisation. The principles for a European security policy should therefore apply to 
a continuum of phases of varying degrees of violence that always involves elements of 
both prevention and reconstruction.  
Likewise, the principles should apply to both ends and means. In discussions 
about security, the focus tends to be on goals. Yet in actual situations where international 
capabilities have been deployed, there is often a disjuncture between the aims set out by 
politicians for security operations, and the means and mandate given to the military and 
civilian agencies. In some instances, mandates have been too restricted and the failure to 
protect people on the ground has undermined the legitimacy of the international effort. 
In other cases, excessive use of force has exacerbated instability.  
Finally, the set of principles proposed below is intended to guide the actions of 
high-level EU officials, politicians in the member states, diplomats, and soldiers and 
civilians in the field alike. Some of these principles (i.e. multilateralism) may be more 
relevant to politicians or diplomats, and others (i.e. use of force) to the military. But it is 
essential to the building of a coherent and effective policy that everyone should have an 
awareness and a shared understanding of all the guiding principles. Moreover, policies 
based on these principles will have more public support, and hence more room for 
manoeuvre, if the European public also understands and endorses them. 
 
3.1 Principle 1: The primacy of human rights 
The primacy of human rights is what distinguishes the human security approach from 
traditional state-based approaches. Although the principle seems obvious, there are 
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deeply held and entrenched institutional and cultural obstacles that have to be overcome 
if it is to be realised in practice. 
In many national governments, it is assumed that state interest overrides the 
promotion of human rights. Traditionally, influence over authoritarian regimes was 
considered more important as a foreign policy goal than the condition of the citizens of 
those regimes.  But authoritarian states have often proved to be unstable in the long run, 
and a policy of promoting human rights is more likely to contribute to preventing 
terrorist and criminal havens and ultimately state failure. The debate about sovereignty 
and the conditions under which human rights concerns should take precedence over 
sovereignty has been a central preoccupation of both practitioners and analysts of foreign 
policy in recent years.  
This debate often neglects the issue of the means to be adopted in so-called 
human rights operations. This is especially important where military means are likely to 
be deployed. It is often assumed that the use of military force is justifiable if there is legal 
authority to intervene (ius ad bellum), and the goals are worthwhile.  However, the 
methods adopted must also be appropriate and, indeed, may affect the ability to achieve 
the goal specified. In other words, the ‘how’ is as important as the ‘why’. This means that 
human rights such as the right to life, the right to housing, or the right to freedom of 
opinion are to be respected and protected even in the midst of conflict. Unless it is 
absolutely necessary and it has a legal basis, personnel deployed on human security 
missions must avoid killing, injury, and material destruction. Human security implies that 
everyone is treated as a citizen. 
This principle has far-reaching implications for military tactics. In the past, 
counter-insurgency operations have sometimes taken a ‘hearts and minds’ approach as a 
tactic. At the same time, coercive methods of control were frequently used, including 
resettlement, area destruction, and control of food supplies (methods adopted by today’s 
insurgents), with the same overall aim of defeating the enemy. In human security 
operations, protection of civilians, not defeating an enemy, is an end in itself. Thus 
certain coercive tactics would be ruled out while other tactics like safe havens or 
humanitarian corridors would have a central role. Principles 6 and 7, below, spell out 
what would constitute operational conduct in line with a human security approach.   
 The primacy of human rights also implies that those commit gross human rights 
violations are treated as individual criminals rather than collective enemies. The 
establishment of the International Criminal Court, the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda and the special tribunal for Sierra Leone were largely predicated on the idea 
that holding only states accountable for human rights violations has done little to 
improve observance of human rights norms, and that assigning individual criminal 
responsibility might be more effective. In the case of terrorism it is equally important to 
realise that the perpetrators are criminal individuals and the means of curbing terrorism 
should be tailored to that insight. 
 
3.2 Principle 2: Clear political authority 
The central goal of a human security strategy has to be the establishment of legitimate 
political authority capable of upholding human security. When authoritarianism breaks 
down, the alternatives are international, national and local governance based on consent, 
or state failure. Diplomacy, sanctions, the provision of aid, and consultations with civil 
society are all among the array of instruments available to the European Union aimed at 
influencing political processes in other countries – opening up authoritarian regimes, 
strengthening legitimate forms of political authority, and promoting inclusive political 
solutions to conflict. The capacity to deploy civilian personnel is a crucial addition to 
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these instruments. They represent the EU’s commitment to help build and sustain 
legitimate political authority in crisis situations. 
 Even if military forces are to be used, they can only succeed on the basis of local 
consent and support. The most that can be achieved through the use of military forces is 
to stabilise the situation so that a space can be created for a political process rather than 
to win through military means alone. In some cases, military victory may simply be 
beyond reach – every excessive use of force further inflames the situation. In other cases, 
short-term military victory can be achieved but the cost in terms both of casualties and 
political legitimacy is too high. Israeli forces for instance have succeeded in slowing down 
the rate of suicide bombing but this has not led to any resolution of the conflict; indeed, 
it has only inflamed more passion on the Palestinian side. Military victory may mean that 
stability can be sustained only through massive repression and coercion. 
 To ensure that the goal of restoring political authority is kept at the forefront of 
any operation, the EU must exert clear political authority over the command and control 
of its missions. This means that, where European security units are deployed, there needs 
to be a close linkage between policy-makers and those on the ground, with the former 
having ultimate control over operations. Human security missions should be led by a 
civilian. This should typically be a politician, or someone with a sense for the politics 
both of the sending states and the host society, with easy access to policy-makers as well 
as receptive to local political actors. This will guarantee a close and iterative linkage 
between policy and operational strategy on the one hand, and the choice of ways and 
means to achieve the right effect on the ground on the other. Politicians have to 
understand the political effects or consequences of deployment; likewise those that are 
sent on missions should understand the political objectives they are working to achieve, 
so that they can design their strategy, with the right set of effects being realised on the 
ground. Of course, this is a point that has always applied in warfare and has been 
emphasised by many of the great military strategists including Clausewitz. But it is easy to 
neglect once the logic of deployment takes over and it is not always integrated into actual 
operations especially on the military side.  
The European Union faces an additional challenge in this respect. The present 
situation, in which troops supposedly under a single line of command in reality still take 
instructions from their own domestic politicians, particularly in emergencies, is 
unworkable. On the other hand, a truly integrated European command structure raises 
the question of democratic control: if basic decisions about deployment, tasks and risks, 
and withdrawal, are taken at the European level, there should be a double accountability: 
to national parliaments and to the European Parliament. In practice however, there could 
be a lack of accountability to either. This point will be revisited in section 5 of this report. 
 
3.3 Principle 3: Multilateralism 
This principle applies first and foremost to the actions of politicians and diplomats, but 
its meaning should also trickle down to operational force levels. We understand 
multilateralism to have a much more comprehensive meaning than ‘acting with a group 
of states’. In that narrow sense, nearly all international initiatives might be considered 
multilateral. Multilateralism is closely related to legitimacy, and has three basic aspects.  
Firstly, it means a commitment to work with international institutions, and 
through the procedures of international institutions. This means, first and foremost, 
working within the United Nations framework, but it also entails working with or sharing 
out tasks among other regional organisations such as the OSCE and NATO in Europe, 
the AU, SADC and ECOWAS in Africa or the OAS in the western hemisphere. Working 
with and through international organisations does not mean having a sacred regard for 
preserving them as they are. Insofar as the EU member states are also members of these 
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institutions, a commitment to effective multilateralism also means a commitment to 
reform these institutions where necessary.  
  Secondly, multilateralism entails a commitment to common ways of working and 
agreed rules and norms: creating common rules and norms, solving problems through 
rules and co-operation, and enforcing the rules. The EU as an international norms 
promoter rather than a superpower is less threatening to non-European states and offers 
a pole around which support could be built in multilateral fora such as the United 
Nations. This is why international law is so important. 
 Thirdly, multilateralism also has to include coordination, rather than duplication 
or rivalry. An effective human security approach requires coordination between 
intelligence, foreign policy, trade policy, development policy and security policy 
initiatives, of the member states, of the Commission and the Council, and of other 
multilateral actors, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF and regional 
institutions. Preventive and pro-active policies cannot be effective if they are isolated and 
even contradictory. This is not a new insight, in fact it is a truism, but it is still not acted 
upon in practice.                                                                                                                                               
 The most dramatic lack of coherence has in the past been between the member 
states and between EU institutions. In the early stages of the Balkan crisis, the EU was 
greatly hampered by internal differences, with Germany supporting the independence of 
Slovenia and Croatia while France and Britain were opposed. In West-Africa in the late 
1990s, the United Kingdom was supporting the Sierra Leonian NPRC government, while 
the German ambassador condemned its excesses, and France refused to put pressure on 
the leaders of Liberia and Burkina Faso who supported the Sierra Leone rebels. In 
several regions, local Commission activities and ESDP missions seem to operate quite 
independently of each other, and sometimes even to be in conflict. If the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) cannot be made truly ‘common’, no amount of 
technical or personnel capabilities can make it effective in contributing to greater security 
for the world or for Europe. Moreover, in line with the principle of multilateralism, the 
EU must endeavour to coordinate its policy with other institutional actors. It is clear that 
institutional rivalries are detrimental to human security on the ground. 
  
3.4 Principle 4: The bottom-up approach 
The decision about the kind of policies to be adopted, whether or not to intervene and 
how, must take account of the most basic needs identified by the people who are 
affected by violence and insecurity. This is not just a moral issue, it is also a matter of 
effectiveness. People who live in the affected area are the best source of intelligence.  
A continuous process of communication, consultation, dialogue and partnership 
can provide a form of early warning and a guide to what strategies are most likely to be 
effective as well as feedback and evaluation for ongoing missions. In effect, the bottom-
up approach is a method of on-the-job learning. Various techniques can be used, 
including local broadcasting and publications, town hall meetings, and question and 
answer sessions, to explain the mission, discover mistakes, receive new information, 
respond to new initiatives, and learn who to involve in implementation. Of course, local 
people will have different views and interests, but missions must familiarise themselves 
with the complex politics of the region. 
 One of the big obstacles to prevention is that situations of insecurity do not 
impinge on political consciousness until it is too late. Often, it is only when humanitarian 
crises are reported in the media that governments feel impelled to act. The problem is 
not just a lack of early warning but also a lack of will. A continuous process of 
consultation and dialogue with local people is not only the way to decide when situations 
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urgently require prevention but it also helps to build a commitment to those involved in 
dialogue, as well as a guide to what strategies are likely to work. 
  It is often difficult to conduct full-scale ‘consultations’ with a population that is in 
a situation of severe insecurity. Nonetheless, a more comprehensive and continuous 
effort should be made to talk to experts, exiles, civil society groups, so as to discover as 
accurately as possible what people want and need. Women’s groups are particularly 
important in this respect. Such groups are generally independent of the parties to the 
conflict and are the main local conduit for humanitarian work; for these reasons they 
often have valuable insights and advice to offer. 
 Once deployment is underway, success depends on the involvement of the local 
population not only for advice and information but also for implementation. In 
Macedonia, for example, civil society groups have acted as partners in efforts to disarm 
militia, providing a conduit for information, and persuading people to give up their 
weapons. 
 The ‘bottom-up’ approach thus suggests a rethinking of intelligence and 
communications policy. Too much intelligence is gathered either by technical means or 
through agents who focus on the governmental level and not enough through 
consultation and dialogue. It is also important to support a hospitable environment for 
local media and for criticism, both to explain the actions and intentions of the mission 
and to understand local politics. 
International interventions can never be more than ‘enabling’. What they can 
achieve depends on the consent of most of the population. There is a tendency among 
‘internationals’ to assume that they know best. Conventional attitudes have too often 
been to ‘do it for them’ or to work with weak or criminalised ‘leaders’. Institution-
building is bound to fail when it excludes those for whom the institutions are built. 
Without a bottom-up approach, an operation cannot successfully work towards its own 
redundancy.  
 The importance of a ‘bottom-up’ approach has been recognised to some extent 
in recent years. However, the solution has primarily been sought in working with 
international NGOs and exiles, who can often provide guidance about whom to contact 
but are not necessarily the best informants for and implementers of a bottom-up policy. 
They are sometimes more oriented towards Brussels, London or Washington than 
towards needy citizens. Despite good intentions, the top-down approach is deeply rooted 
in international institutions, not only in attitudes but also in the culture that develops 
around international missions; the ways in which international officials remain within 
their own circles, and are often on very short-term missions with little long-term 
commitment. 
 
3.5 Principle 5: Regional focus 
New wars have no clear boundaries. They tend to spread through refugees and displaced 
persons, through minorities who live in different places, through criminal and extremist 
networks. Indeed most situations of severe insecurity are located in regional clusters. The 
tendency to focus attention on areas that are defined in terms of statehood has often 
meant that relatively simple ways of preventing the spread of violence are neglected. 
Time and again, foreign policy analysts have been taken by surprise when, after 
considerable attention had been given to one conflict, another conflict would seemingly 
spring up out of the blue in a neighbouring state. Thus, the failure to include Kosovo in 
the Dayton negotiations over Bosnia Herzegovina was one factor that led to the outbreak 
of the war in Kosovo in 1999. In 2001, despite being intensely involved in Kosovo, and 
to a lesser extent in Albania, the build-up of violence in Macedonia still came initially as a 
 18
A Human Security Doctrine for Europe 
surprise to the EU. In West Africa, the conflict in Sierra Leone could have been 
prevented by addressing the conflict in Liberia. 
A regional focus also has a sub-state dimension. In the Balkans, the EU is 
involved in combating both organised crime and ethnic violence in Bosnia, Macedonia 
and Kosovo. These efforts each fall under a different mission however, and they are not 
sufficiently linked up. Moreover, there is no such involvement in combating very similar 
problems in southern Serbia, because this region happens now to be part of a different 
state, which does not have an EU mission. 
A regional focus is not only an issue for intelligence-gatherers or diplomats, it 
also has operational implications. The UN involvement in the Great Lakes region in 
Africa has been characterised by piecemeal interventions confined to one state, whilst 
refugees and combatants crossed borders back and forth. 
Moreover, the common practice in multinational operations of parcelling out 
separate pieces of territory to each national force can lead to damaging discontinuities of 
practice. A continuous regional focus could instead allow successful practices to spread 
quickly from one locality to the next. 
 
3.6 Principle 6: Use of legal instruments 
The use of law, and particularly international law, as an instrument does not pertain just 
to diplomatic fora and decisions concerning whether to intervene: they are at the core of 
how operations should be conducted.  
At an operational level, the primary task of any deployment is to assist law-
enforcement. This means that a much larger investment will have to be made in civilian 
capabilities for law-enforcement, i.e. police, court officials, prosecutors and judges. The 
EU is just beginning to comprehend this task in the Balkans. For the military, it means a 
shift from the traditional use of military force as war fighting to that of law enforcement. 
The military have to be actively involved in assisting the police and civil authorities. They 
are not only by their mere presence acting to make the population that they work within 
feel more secure, but are embarking on operations designed to provide information, 
intelligence and evidence for use in courts: operations that can directly lead to the 
prosecution and conviction of organised criminals, corrupt officials and those who 
commit acts of terror. In situations like Bosnia and Kosovo, for example, greater efforts 
to bring about justice could have made a big difference to the depth and speed of reform 
and reconstruction.  
Unlike in classic wars where only states bore responsibility, armed forces have to 
act within a legal framework that applies to individuals. Operations by the European 
Union should have legal accountability mechanisms open to those who are ‘operated’ 
upon. There should be not only codes of behaviour for the troops involved, but also 
sanctions for breaking the codes. 
But whose law should be applied? While local law continues to apply in principle, 
the answer to this question is by no means straightforward in failed states, where there 
has been a breakdown of law and order, or in repressive states, where relevant domestic 
laws may lack legitimacy. A coherent legal framework is crucial so as to provide legal 
security to troops as well as to the local population.  
The local population should be involved in the administration of justice as much 
as possible. Citizens in these situations need to regain the protection of the law, and to 
help transform it if the old laws were unjust or repressive. In some cases, skilled and 
politically untainted police and legal staff are available to do most of the work, and all 
they need is military protection and a stamp of international legitimacy. In other cases, a 
legal system has to be rebuilt from the ground up, while there are many in-between 
scenarios in which training and mixed international-local staffing would be appropriate.  
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Finally, the principle implies that terrorists, war criminals, human rights violators 
and drug traffickers are subject to legal procedure. They should face fair trials according 
to international human rights standards, whether before international, domestic or hybrid 
courts. 
 
3.7 Principle 7: Appropriate use of force 
Classic warfare is between sides. Soldiers must protect themselves and civilians on their 
own side and an effort is also made to minimise civilian casualties on the other side. The 
emphasis on firepower and technology, however, has often meant heavy loss of life 
especially among enemy soldiers but also among civilians. In human security operations, 
the lives of those deployed cannot be privileged. The aim should be to protect people 
and minimise all casualties. This is more akin to the traditional approach of the police, 
who risk their lives to save others, even though they are prepared to kill in extremis, as 
human security forces should be. Hence, in line with principle 1 (primacy of human 
rights) and principle 6 (legal instruments), minimum force is key. Minimum force 
suggests for instance that it would be an over-reaction to kill someone who threatens 
violence when an arrest can be made.  
 Our approach does not suggest that the use of force is to be avoided under all 
circumstances. Nothing should undermine the inherent right of self-defence.  If someone 
is threatening violence a soldier can respond appropriately, regardless of whether force 
has been authorised under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 
Although this might seem obvious, it was, in part, the failure of elements of the UN 
Mission in Sierra Leone in 2000 to appreciate the right of self-defence that partially led to 
a collapse of the mission and a tactical victory for the Revolutionary United Front.  
Peacekeepers have often negotiated their way out of trouble but where the judgement of 
the commander was in doubt, or when negotiations failed, there have been severe 
consequences when force has not been used in self-defence. A prime example is the 
killing of the Belgian troops in Rwanda by Hutu militia in 1994 after they had given up 
their weapons.  
There may even be situations where it is legitimate to kill someone who is trying 
to kill a third party. Clearly, soldiers need to be confident of their rights to use force and 
have to tailor their tactical decision-making to the situation they find themselves in. 
However, they remain legally accountable for their actions and should face prosecution 
in court when the legality of their use of force is in question. 
 The use of minimal and precise force, of course, puts troops at more immediate 
risk than using overwhelming force. This logic should be appreciated by the military, the 
politicians and the general public. 
 
4 Capabilities required 
 
In order to be able to implement a security policy based on the principles set out above, 
the European Union is going to need two key capabilities. It will need an integrated set 
of civil-military capabilities that would be suited to carry out human security operations, 
and it will need a legal framework that underpins decisions to intervene as well forming 
the basis for a law-enforcement approach to operations. 
 
4.1 The Human Security Response Force 
Integrated capabilities for integrated tasks 
This report does not contain a set menu of tasks for human security missions. The 
literature on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions has already spawned many lists of 
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military and civilian tasks that need to be carried out with various degrees of urgency and 
in various mixes. These include the (re)establishment of law and order, reconstruction, 
humanitarian aid, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), transitional 
justice, institution-building, support for civil society, independent media and education, 
and so on.  
There can be no blueprint expected to fit every situation, regardless of whether 
local governance structures are in place or whether the international community assumes 
responsibility for them. The key to identifying tasks should be the ‘bottom-up’ approach 
– an extensive consultation process and the use of intelligence based on local knowledge. 
It is crucial for the European Union to have a capacity to assess the different 
requirements of particular situations, especially in response to local concerns.  
 Tasks should be identified and implemented in a holistic way. Tasks cannot be 
neatly categorised in separate boxes. The focus of this report is stabilising the situation 
and diminishing human insecurity –tasks which tend to be described as law and order or 
public security. How this is achieved can range from an international civil presence 
designed to offer reassurance, monitor human rights violations and reduce tension, to the 
provision of civilian expertise to strengthen local law enforcement institutions, or to the 
use of military forces to provide physical protection, separate warring parties and disarm 
armed groups. But public security can never be achieved in isolation.  Lack of food and 
water can be a source of violence.  Involving women’s groups, ensuring fair and accurate 
reporting, or creating jobs are all related tasks that are critical for public security.  
All these tasks require highly specialised skills and, at the same time, they need to 
be coordinated. For these reasons, an integrated civil-military force is most suitable for 
carrying out human security missions. Military troops will be an important component of 
these operational capacities, but they will have to restructure and reequip along new lines 
and they will need to be integrated with civilian capabilities, such as police, tax and 
customs officers, judges, administrators, providers of aid and human rights specialists. 
The ultimate aim is to be able to deploy different packages of military-civilian capabilities 
according to the situation. 
There are considerable obstacles to overcome. Among civilians, the military are 
often associated with a mission of violence, which is considered to conflict with and 
indeed may hamper the purposes of civilian officers, in particular aid-providers. In Iraq 
and Afghanistan, for example, aid agencies including the UN were reluctant to accept US 
military protection for fear it would affect their access to and acceptance among the local 
population.  Before the attacks on the UN headquarters in Iraq in August 2003, UN 
senior management felt uncomfortable about the presence of Coalition Forces and asked 
on several occasions for the removal of protective positions and equipment from the UN 
compound. Such suspicion of the military can affect human security operations as well. 
Among the military, there is tendency to assume that civilians ‘get in the way’ and 
are less efficient at carrying out specified tasks or that the military’s job is war-fighting, 
not nation-building or protecting humanitarian aid workers. Both sides need to adapt. 
Effective civil –military integration is only possible in situations where the military act in 
a law-enforcement role and the civil agencies are part of a combined politically led 
operation.  
In addition, the balance of military-civil capabilities needs to be changed. 
Civilians tend to operate in small teams and with a great deal of autonomy, in contrast to 
large and hierarchically organised military machines. Any deployment needs to include a 
very substantial contingent of civilians, who would co-determine the nature and culture 
of the operation. It is very important that civil-military integration applies at planning 
level as well as the operational level. The EU’s recently established joint civil-military 
planning unit is a first step in this direction. 
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Size, composition, command system 
We propose the creation of a Human Security Response Force, composed of both 
military and civilians. The force should be roughly the size of a division, 15,000 
personnel. Thus it would be possible to deploy the force in a situation like Kosovo or 
smaller forces for contingencies like Macedonia or the recent operation in DRC. At least 
one-third of the 15,000 personnel would be police and civilian specialists. The idea is to 
develop a model, which would start as a small force but could easily be scaled up on the 
basis of experience.  
The force would be composed of three tiers, making use of various capabilities 
that already exist within the ESDP framework. The first tier would build on the existing 
civil-military planning headquarters in Brussels. It would be composed of strategic 
planners, with a capacity for analysis of intelligence and information, and a civil-military 
crisis management centre, with a capacity for assessing what military and civil capabilities, 
both European and local, are needed in a particular crisis situation. The bottom-up 
principle is critical to the success of missions. Procedures and institutions are needed that 
allow for consultations and discussions with the local population so as to increase the 
efficiency of the mission. The newly created External Action Service, together with EU 
monitoring missions, could play an important role in offering the framework for 
institutionalised consultation. Both would have close communication with the permanent 
headquarters so as to maintain the flow of information and understanding about 
different areas of insecurity. 
In addition to the permanent staff, the headquarters would be able to call upon 
observers/monitors/special representatives who could be sent to particular regions in 
advance of any deployment in response to early warning signals given by EU monitors or 
representatives on the ground as well as civil society and other key local actors. It also 
needs access to what we describe as ‘deployment enablers’ – people able to mobilise 
capabilities such as strategic communications, air lift and other forms of transport. 
The second tier would consist of 5000 personnel at a high level of readiness able 
to deploy within days. They would include civil-military teams and a deployable 
command and control headquarters. They would be on permanent standby constantly 
training and exercising together and ‘breathing human security’. They would be able, at 
short notice, to deploy ‘Human Security Task Forces’.  
The third tier would consist of the remaining 10,000 personnel, who would be at 
a lower level of readiness but nevertheless could be called on for deployment and who 
would periodically train and exercise together. 
The personnel of the entire Human Security Response Force would be drawn 
from three sources.  Military personnel could be drawn from the 60,000 troops made 
available under the Headline Goal, agreed in Helsinki in December 2001, for a European 
Rapid Reaction Force, as well as from forces who straddle the military/police divide, 
such as gendarmerie, guardia civil and carabinieri. The civilian component would include 
police, legal specialists, human rights monitors, tax and customs officers, humanitarian 
aid workers, doctors and medical personnel etc,. They would be drawn from civilian 
capabilities made available by member states, under the civilian Headline Goals, including 
police forces and pools of civilian specialists, already on the Commission’s expert roster. 
Both the second and third tiers of  personnel would be normally based at their home 
garrisons or in civilian employment but would be on standby for deployment, with 
varying degrees of time spent on joint training and exercises. It is harder for civilians to 
take leave from their positions at short notice, so the EU could subsidise small cadres 
who are earmarked for foreign service and receive special training, but who serve in their 
domestic capacity when not deployed or exercising. A particular effort should be made to 
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attract women in all roles, including senior positions, in order to redress the usual gender 
imbalance in deployments. 
Thirdly, while the force should have a professional core, it should also have a 
voluntary element to contribute to the human security task forces. This ‘Human Security 
Volunteer Service’ should comprise two elements: mid-career or post-career 
professionals with skills to offer; and school-leavers and students who would be used for 
less challenging missions. This combines the proposals made by the European 
Parliament for a Civil Peace Corps (the first element) and the Humanitarian Volunteer 
Aid Service included in the Constitution (the second element). The envisaged scheme 
would be rigorous, with a two-year time commitment. This would be similar to the 
current use of reserves for operations.  
The Human Security Response Force should be multinational with national 
military building blocks not below battalion level. There must be clear political authority 
both in Brussels and at the operational level. Directly below the overall commander, 
chosen for his or her political skills, would be a tactical commander, who could be either 
military or police or humanitarian, depending on the nature of the mission. 
 
Equipment 
A human security force relies primarily on smart manpower rather than high-tech 
gadgetry. However, it will need a European capacity to produce two basic types of 
equipment, for both military and civilian use. The first is ICT equipment, relating to 
observation, information-gathering and telecommunications, which needs to be able to 
operate autonomously. Secondly, there is materiel equipment, particularly transport. A 
deployable headquarters, a command and control system, aircraft carriers and other 
transportation equipment should be dedicated to the EU force. Equipment needs to be 
cost-effective and easy to deploy. To reduce costs and increase flexibility, where possible, 
equipment like planes, trucks, jeeps and helicopters, as well as communications systems, 
for example mobile phones,  should be usable in a range of tasks and have both civilian 
and military components. They need to be compatible and interoperable both among 
member states and between civilian and military. 
 
Training, culture and ethos 
Perhaps the most important challenge is the considerable cultural shift both for the 
military and civilians. The new type of human security officer will be highly skilled and 
flexible about the kinds of tasks that need to be carried out. The new units will have to 
develop a common ethos, which will require the following elements: 
 
• putting individual human beings, whoever they might be, above nation or 
homeland 
• maintaining the military spirit of sacrifice, heroism, discipline and excellence 
but combining it with the civilian spirit of listening, individual responsibility, 
empathy and enabling others 
• respect for and knowledge of law, in particular human rights and humanitarian 
law and general principles of criminal law 
• ewareness of gender dimensions of conflict and intervention 
 
This shift is best achieved through training and joint exercises. Already, the EU’s pilot 
civilian training has established a network of national training centres within which 
different institutions specialise in different areas; for example, the Swedish programme is 
specialising in training for the rule of law. This has the disadvantage of developing 
national specialisms but it also encourages individual member states to make 
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commitments and avoids unnecessary duplication. The training schemes should be open 
to all nationalities belonging to the force. All members of the human security force 
should have some experience of working together. 
 
Relations with NGOs and private corporations 
NGOs could be registered as part of the Human Security Volunteer Service, along with 
individuals. The Service could provide a framework for contracts with NGOs that would 
involve vetting to ensure that they were reliable and effective These contracts would 
entitle them to participate in training and exercises, as well as being deployed as part of a 
wider force. For private corporations, there could be a registration procedure and tenders 
for certain non-military tasks such as logistics or communications, but they should not 
form an integral part of the force. 
 
4.2 A legal framework 
The capacity of the EU to act a ‘norms-promoter’, operating within international law, 
furthering international law and using legal instruments to enhance security, is hindered 
by the absence of a single and coherent body of international law governing foreign 
deployments. Rules are ambiguous and subject to controversy both with respect to the 
legality of deployments per se, and the legal regimes that govern deployed personnel, 
military and civilian, and locals, in a conflict area.  
 While the tangle of concurrent jurisdictional regimes cannot be resolved in one 
fell swoop, the EU should tackle these deficits in the international legal system and 
encourage the development of global rules. In the meantime, the EU can contribute to 
greater legal clarity by devising its own legal framework governing its foreign missions 
generally. Such a framework should concern both decisions to intervene and the rules 
that apply in situations where troops are deployed. In cases where the EU has a more 
profound involvement, it can be supplemented by a more detailed charter of rules, to be 
developed in consultation with the local population.  
In some cases, personnel will be deployed with the permission of or even at the 
request of the state in question. In other cases, there may be no such permission, or there 
may no longer be a functioning government that might give permission. The UN 
Security Council has authorised interventions in cases that are considered to constitute a 
‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’. Since the end of the Cold 
War, it has regularly characterised situations of massive human rights violations in these 
terms, and has authorised interventions on this basis in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, since the Kosovo war there has also been a debate 
on whether there should be an opening for humanitarian intervention not based on a 
Security Council Resolution. Various international commissions have attempted to 
formulate criteria for such interventions. Many other experts, however, continue to be of 
the opinion that any deviation from the Security Council framework would open the 
floodgates to unilateral action with dubious motives. 
If there is to be any complement at all to the Security Council route, it should be 
very narrow and unambiguous. Most states tend to claim that the wars they wage are 
‘just’. If the European Union were to decide to open the way to intervention without 
Security Council authorisation, then a legal framework should include the criteria and 
legal basis for such interventions.   
 As concerns the personnel who are deployed on foreign missions and the local 
populations affected by such missions, the legal framework could build on the domestic 
law of the host state, the domestic law of the member states and the rules of engagement, 
international criminal law, human rights law, and international humanitarian law. The 
framework would need to encompass the following issues: 
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• First of all, deployed personnel should be subject to the domestic law of the 
host state, just like the local population. This is in line with most domestic legal 
systems, and with the principle that ‘internationals’ should not be treated 
differently from nationals. Some EU member states may need to adjust their 
legal provisions in order to accept the jurisdiction of the host state over 
deployed personnel. However, in situations of severe insecurity –failed states 
and/or authoritarian states – the rule of law may have partially or completely 
broken down or domestic law may conflict with international law. The legal 
framework needs to offer guidance about what to do in such situations: 
whether and how EU personnel can be involved in enforcing laws they are not 
familiar with; whether certain parts of domestic law can be set aside, and if so, 
on what legal authority; and whether and how international human rights law or 
international criminal law could be applied where domestic law is inadequate or 
inappropriate. A deployment of legal specialists may sometimes be necessary to 
assess these issues, in consultation with local legal professionals and guided by 
the framework. 
 
• Secondly, the legal framework needs to address differences in member states’ 
domestic law that could lead to unequal treatment of deployed personnel. 
When a multinational Human Security Force is deployed, each member is 
subject to his or her own domestic rules, particularly criminal law. This creates 
legal confusion both for deployed personnel and the locals dealing with them. 
One possibility might be to develop a common criminal code that would apply 
only to personnel on foreign missions, based on common principles of EU 
criminal codes. A better solution in the short term, which the EU is already 
taking steps to develop, is detailed common rules of engagement. These should 
cover both military and civilian personnel. A human rights-oriented, bottom-up 
approach would require that the rules of engagement are public, and are 
translated into local languages, so that the local population is aware of them. 
Specific attention should be paid in the rules of engagement to the gender 
dimensions of deployment: the presence of large numbers of unattached men 
creates physical security concerns for women, especially when the men have 
comparatively large amounts of money available, and can offer forms of 
employment. As seen in Cambodia, Bosnia, Somalia and elsewhere their 
presence creates the potential for increased prostitution, sexual violence and 
connivance or even participation in trafficking. There should be a clear sexual 
code of conduct for deployed personnel. 
 
• Thirdly, an EU legal framework should bring clarity to possible conflicts 
between different forms of international law, particularly between human rights 
and humanitarian law. International humanitarian law regulates actions that 
would be illegal outside conflict, such as killing of enemy combatants and 
destruction of enemy property. It is much more detailed than human rights law, 
but at the same time it is in some ways outmoded, for instance because 
distinctions between ‘inter-state conflict’, ‘internal conflict’ and ‘peace time’ and 
between ‘combatants’ and ‘civilians’ are now often blurred. It would be 
consistent with the ‘primacy of human rights’ principle for the EU to give 
precedence to human rights when the two conflict. The legal framework should 
also fully reflect international conventional law on weapons. 
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• Fourthly, the legal framework should spell out complaints procedures open to 
local citizens in conflict areas as well as to deployed personnel. This point will 
be revisited in section 5.2 of this report. 
 
5 Institutional embedding and resourcing 
 
The Constitution, agreed in Dublin in June 2004, has made a significant innovation with 
the new institution of a Foreign Minister, merging the posts of High Representative for 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and External Relations Commissioner. The 
Foreign Minister will have the right of initiative in CFSP, and be in charge of an 
integrated European External Action Service composed of officials from the relevant 
departments of the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers and of the 
Commission, and staff seconded from national diplomatic services.  
The new Foreign Minister’s cabinet is therefore the natural home for the Human 
Security Response Force. The Council’s Military Committee and Military Staff, 
CIVCOM, and the Commission’s Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit 
(CPCMU) can all be merged into the new civil-military planning unit, located under the 
Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister will answer to the European Council and the 
Council of Ministers. He will continue to be advised by the Political Security Committee 
and the EU Military Committee. He will also be responsible for coordination of policies 
with other relevant EU institutions, such as, in particular, EuropeAid and ECHO. 
These institutional reforms should greatly improve the coherence and co-
ordination of EU mission. Further measures are needed to improve democratic control 
by the European public and accountability to local populations, and to guarantee 
sustainable and appropriate methods of financing. 
 
5.1 Democratic control 
In the area of European security policy, the well-known ‘democratic deficit’ is aggravated 
by a lack of transparency and a ‘double deficit’ in parliamentary scrutiny.   
The lack of transparency results primarily from the tradition of secrecy within the 
security sector where the flow of information is often hampered by restrictive 
classification and confidentiality procedures. The problem is exacerbated by the blurring 
of responsibilities among the various actors and institutions operating within European 
security policy.  
Parliamentary scrutiny of European security policy is extremely weak. As the core 
of European security policy is intergovernmental, the primary role of parliamentary 
scrutiny belongs to the 25 national parliaments of the Member States. In theory, national 
parliaments can hold their government to account for decisions reached in the European 
Council or Council of Ministers – if they are taken by unanimity. In practice, however, 
effective oversight is difficult to realise due to weak and uneven scrutiny practices and 
control rights in the different Member States. Furthermore, national parliaments still rely 
on the information provided by their own executives. There are no formal mechanisms 
in European security policy for informing national parliaments about other Member 
States’ positions or to receive reports directly from the European Union.  
Scrutiny by the European Parliament (EP) is mostly limited to the integrated 
security activities of the EC framework. The EP does have a say in the CFSP budget, but, 
as all expenditures arising from operations with military or defence implications are 
charged to the Member States, its budgetary authority is very limited. In all other CFSP 
aspects the EP only has the right to be kept informed on current policy developments. 
While in the medium-term a fully satisfactory institutional solution to the democratic 
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deficit is not in sight, a number of measures could be considered, that might help bridge 
the accountability gap in European security policy, such as: 
 
• increasing public access to relevant documents and obliging the Council to 
transmit all ESDP documents to national parliaments,  
• enhancing and standardising the power of Member States’ parliaments in the 
authorisation of EU security operations 
• strengthening inter-parliamentary cooperation by institutionalising regular 
meetings of the national Parliamentary Defence Committees (or their chairs) or 
by producing a joint parliamentary report on European security policy 
•  giving the EP greater authority in scrutinising the CFSP budget 
 
5.2 Bottom-up accountability 
EU missions at present tend to be top-down –they focus on relations with states. 
Bottom-up effectiveness and legitimacy need to be embedded in the institutional 
framework of European security policy. 
 First, EU missions should explain and consult the local population about the 
goals and methods of the missions through political communication and debate. There 
need to be inbuilt mechanisms such as regular public hearings and broadcasts or the 
appointment of local liaison officers to ensure this takes place. It is critical that local 
information, perspectives, ideas and proposals are transmitted upwards to those 
responsible for directing the mission.   
Secondly, the legal framework governing missions in general and the common 
rules of engagement must be publicly available. In cases where personnel are investigated 
and prosecuted for misconduct during the mission, the relevant local population must be 
kept informed of, and where appropriate, participate in, the ongoing proceedings. 
 Thirdly, there need to be complaints procedures. Under international law, there 
are several avenues open to citizens in regions where missions are deployed to complain 
about possible human rights violating behaviour by deployed EU personnel. An optional 
protocol to the International Covenant on Criminal and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified 
by all EU member states except the United Kingdom, allows individuals to complain 
about violation of the rights in this treaty. Along the same lines, the jurisdiction of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) may be extended to the behaviour of 
EU personnel outside the Union, allowing non-EU citizens to complain in Strasbourg 
about possible human rights violations by EU personnel. In both cases, the EU could 
voluntarily extend jurisdiction via a legal framework or legal charter.  
 But there should also be more immediate forms of redress in the event of 
misconduct by deployed personnel. One way to do this is through the appointment of a 
human security ombudsperson attached to each mission. The ombudsman concept is 
very familiar in the European Union, and several member states have experience with a 
specialised ombudsperson for the security sector. The mission ombudsperson would be 
responsible for investigating complaints by local citizens as well as EU personnel 
regarding abuses or offences committed by the Human Security Response Force. He or 
she would be appointed by the European Parliament and report regularly to the 
Parliament, and possibly also to national parliaments, either by request or if the alleged 
case relates to a specific national security force. He or she could further operate as a ‘legal 
information point’, informing the local population of their rights and duties and of the 
legal provisions in place during the operation.  
 Finally, each mission should be accompanied and followed by policy evaluation, 
and in particular impact assessment, from a local perspective. In development 
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cooperation, regular and thorough evaluation of the impact of policies and instruments 
has become the order of the day. But there is less evaluation concerning crisis 
management policies and their military and civilian instruments, and when it is carried 
out, it takes less account of local perspectives. In-depth study of the impact of European 
security policy is not only essential for enhancing bottom-up effectiveness and 
responsiveness, but also for institutionalising a process of policy-learning within the 
European Union. Impact assessment should not just take place internally: after each 
mission, an independent commission should be tasked with a public evaluation. 
 
5.3 Financing 
Europeans have to be willing to invest in human security if they want security for 
themselves. The military component of the Human Security Response Force can 
probably be financed by reallocating existing procurement spending from  traditional 
military equipment such as  heavy tanks, artillery and surface ships to the smart 
manpower and equipment needed by the Human Security Response Force and by 
making savings by liberalising, standardising, and consolidating European procurement 
procedures. This is already happening in several European countries. Additional 
resources will be required to enhance Brussels-based capacities, civilian capabilities, and 
training and common exercises.  
 It would be in the interest of coherence and integration if the Human Security 
Response Force, both as a standing force and in deployments, were to be financed out of 
the EU’s common budget under the CFSP. The Constitution, following earlier treaties,  
explicitly excludes military spending, including on deployments, from the common 
budget. This provision, which does not apply to civilian deployment, is an obstacle to the 
eventual formation of an integrated force, and should in the long run be amended.  
 In the short term, deployment of the Human Security Response Force can operate 
under the 2002 compromise, which provides that costs such as headquarters (transport, 
administration, common public information) and shared services (medical costs, 
additional equipment and infrastructures) are common, and that certain other costs, such 
as transportation of forces, barracks, and lodging of forces, will be decided upon by the 
Council on a case-by-case basis, at the launch of any operation. Civilian deployment 
should be commonly financed insofar as it concerns core staff and members of the 
volunteer service scheme. Deployment from the national special teams should still be 
financed nationally, in parallel to military deployment. Otherwise, those states that deploy 
mostly military troops would be disadvantaged vis-à-vis those that send civilians. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
In the past, conventional thinking about security focused on strategic assets like oil, and 
strategic threats like the possession of weapons of mass destruction by enemy states. The 
security of the lives of human beings outside our own borders was conceived as an 
ethical issue, in the realm of human rights or development cooperation, but without 
relevance to the security of Europeans. This report has sought to argue that human 
security is vitally connected to the security of Europeans, and that the European Union 
therefore has a critical interest in developing capabilities to make a contribution to global 
human security.  
The proposals seek to improve Europe’s capacity for external personnel 
deployment. Based on studies of a number of conflict areas, i.e. ‘the world as it is’, it has 
made a number of recommendations to optimise the use of missions. While this includes 
preventive and reconstruction missions, the report does not cover common foreign and 
security policy as a whole.  
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The report has posited a ‘human security doctrine’ for Europe, starting with 
seven principles that should inform European security policy from the level of politicians 
to the level of common soldiers, police and aid-workers. It has described the contours of 
a civil-military ‘Human Security Response Force’ that would be equipped to act to 
protect and improve human security according to these principles. The proposed force 
does not seek to replace current national forces and multilateral structures. It constitutes 
an urgently needed addition, which the European Union is particularly well-suited to 
provide. In accordance with its conception that law, sometimes backed by the use of 
force, is a key instrument for the European Union, it has recommended a legal 
framework for deployments. Finally, it has considered some of the financial and 
institutional implications of a human security doctrine for Europe. 
 Since September 11 and the war in Iraq, there has been a fundamental rethinking 
of the nature of security. Security has re-emerged as an urgent concern for Europeans, 
but it cannot be provided by hiding under nuclear umbrellas. There is an open door for 
discussing proposals like this in Europe right now. At the individual level of citizens, a 
conviction is growing that Europe may have an independent role to play in global 
security, and support for proposals like the Rapid Reaction Force is strong. At the 
institutional level too, the European Union is, for the first time, considering a global 
security role. The most appropriate role for Europe in the twenty-first century would be 
to promote human security. 
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